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Abstract 
Previous research suggests that we systematically overestimate the occurrence of both positive 
and negative events, compared to neutral future events, and that these biases are due to a 
misattribution of arousal elicited by utility (Stake-Likelihood Hypothesis, SLH, Vosgerau, 2010). 
However, extant research has provided only indirect support for these arousal misattribution 
processes. In the present research, we initially aimed to provide a direct test of the SLH by 
measuring arousal with galvanic skin responses to examine the mediating role of arousal. We 
observed no evidence that measured arousal mediated the impact of utility on probability 
estimates. Given the lack of direct support for the SLH in Experiment 1, Experiments 2-5 aimed 
to assess the SLH by replicating some of the original findings that provided support for arousal 
misattribution as a mechanism. Despite our best efforts to create experimental conditions under 
which we would be able to demonstrate the stake-likelihood effect, we were unable to replicate 
previous results, with a Bayesian meta-analysis demonstrating support for the null hypothesis. 
We propose that accounts based on imaginability and loss function asymmetry are currently 
better candidate explanations for the influence of outcome utility on probability estimates.  
 
Keywords: Probability, Utility, Arousal Misattribution, Stake-Likelihood Hypothesis, 
Replication 
  
     THE ROLE OF AROUSAL IN LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES 3 
Introduction 
 Living in a world dominated by uncertainty, we are confronted with the situation of not 
knowing whether any given proposition is true on a daily basis. Will it rain today? Will the new 
phone we want to buy be in stock when we arrive at the store? We must however make 
appropriate decisions (‘Should I carry an umbrella?’) in the light of this uncertainty. Subjective 
Expected Utility Theory (Savage, 1954) prescribes how decisions ought to be made under such 
circumstances, and it prescribes a central role for probability estimates. The accuracy of these 
probability estimates will directly affect an individual’s future utility. Thus, understanding 
systematic biases in probability judgment is a central question in judgment and decision making 
research. In the current paper, we are concerned with the biasing effect that utility can have on 
probability estimates. 
An accumulated body of evidence suggests that the utility of an event might bias how 
likely we believe it is that the event will occur. One line of enquiry claims that we estimate the 
occurrence of an event to be more likely when we want the event to occur (Babad, 1995; Babad 
& Katz, 1991; Granberg & Brent, 1983; Massey, Simmons & Amor, 2011; Simmons & Massey, 
2012; Vosgerau, 2010; but see Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Bar-Hillel, Budescu & Amar, 2008; 
de Molière, Harris, Quantmeyer & Hahn, 2014; Krizan & Windschitl, 2007), and another line of 
research proposes that we provide greater probability estimates when we don’t want the event to 
occur (Bilgin, 2012; de Molière, 2014; Harris, Corner & Hahn, 2009; Mandel, 2008; Risen & 
Gilovich, 2007; Vosgerau, 2010). The former, when “the desirability of an outcome leads to an 
increase in the extent to which it is expected to occur” (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007, p. 96), has 
been coined wishful thinking. Its counterpart, the undesirability bias, exists when the 
undesirability of an outcome leads to an increase in the extent to which it is expected to occur. 
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However, the mechanism that underlies the potential impact of utility on probability estimates 
remains subject to discussion. For instance, previous research proposed that approach-avoidance 
motivation (Lench, 2009; see also Lench & Bench, 2012; Lench & Darbor, 2014) could explain 
wishful thinking effects, whilst there is some empirical support for the role of enhanced 
spontaneous imaginability (Bilgin, 2012; Risen & Gilovich, 2007) and asymmetric loss functions 
(Harris et al., 2009; see also, de Molière, 2014) as explanations for the undesirability bias.  
However, none of these theories has been supported as an explanation for both wishful thinking 
effects and the undesirability bias.   
In contrast, Vosgerau (2010) provided a unifying theory for both wishful thinking effects 
and the undesirability bias with the “Stake-Likelihood Hypothesis” (SLH). Vosgerau (2010) 
proposed that the arousal from having a stake (either positive or negative) in the outcome is 
misattributed to probability estimates, increasing estimates for both positive and negative 
compared to neutral events. However, Vosgerau’s (2010) evidential support for the SLH relied 
on somewhat indirect assessments of arousal misattribution. In the present research, we sought to 
examine the precise mechanism through which the proposed arousal misattribution might occur 
by directly measuring arousal by means of galvanic skin responses.  
The Stake-Likelihood Hypothesis 
 Vosgerau (2010) postulated that misattribution of arousal (excitation transfer, Zillmann, 
1971) exhibited by positive or negative events leads to an overestimation of outcome 
probabilities. That is, the judgment of an event’s likelihood depends on how aroused the decision 
maker is- the higher the arousal, the more likely the decision maker judges the event to be. Since 
arousal is non-specific (Schachter & Singer, 1962), and sticky (Cantor, Zillmann, & Bryant, 
1975), residual arousal can influence a target despite the removal of the arousal-eliciting 
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stimulus. Dutton and Aron (1974), for example, demonstrated that male participants were more 
likely to accept the phone number from an attractive female confederate, as well as to report 
greater sexual imagery, when crossing a scary bridge, which increased arousal, compared to a 
non-scary, non-arousing bridge. It is assumed that the residual arousal experienced from crossing 
the scary bridge led participants to infer a greater attraction towards the experimenter. Vosgerau 
(2010) argues that similar arousal transfer holds for probability estimates: first, there is evidence 
that having a stake in the outcome - positive or negative - increases physiological arousal (Eliott, 
1964; Schnore, 1959). Secondly, if a valenced event has a greater likelihood of occurring it 
should be associated with a greater level of arousal. For example, if there is a high probability of 
getting into an accident, arousal levels should be higher than for lower chances of getting into an 
accident. Thus, greater arousal should be associated with greater probabilities of valenced events 
occurring, and Vosgerau (2010) postulates that the arousal from having a stake in the outcome is 
misattributed to the likelihood of the event occurring. Vosgerau (2010) assessed the SLH in four 
experiments, which shall be discussed below.  
In Study 11, Vosgerau (2010) aimed to demonstrate that greater arousal levels give rise to 
higher estimates of likelihood. Participants provided nine likelihood judgments (e.g., how likely 
to do you think Barack Obama is to become the Democratic presidential candidate?”) on either 
grey or bright pink paper, the latter assumed to be more arousing than the former. Supporting the 
notion that the arousal from answering on pink paper is misattributed to probability estimates, 
participants provided higher estimates when answering on pink compared to on grey paper. 
However, the impact of arousal on probability estimates was here only assumed – there was no 
                                                 
1 Vosgerau (2010) identifies his experiments as ‘Studies.’ To aid exposition, we therefore use the word ‘study’ to 
refer to his original studies, and ‘experiment’ to refer to the present experiments. 
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evidence that it was truly arousal that led to an increase in probability estimates when 
participants answered on pink paper. Indeed, the colour pink might have other effects that could 
influence probability estimates. Pink has, for example, been shown to worsen performance 
(Pellegrini & Schauss, 1980; Pellegrini, Schauss & Birk, 1980; but see Gilliam, 1991). Since the 
concrete mechanism through which the impact of colour might operate is not demonstrated, this 
first study does not constitute direct evidence for the role of arousal misattribution.  
Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 2 tested the SLH in the positive domain. Participants were 
informed that they would win $5 if a 3 was rolled at least once in a series of four dice throws, 
and asked to estimate the likelihood of this event occurring, and rate how exciting it was to play 
the game, either before or after providing the probability estimates. Thus, Study 2 made use of a 
classic arousal misattribution paradigm: arousal is only misattributed if participants are unaware 
of the actual source of arousal. If participants misattribute arousal, they should be less likely to 
do so once the source of the arousal is made salient and they can thus attribute their arousal to 
the actual source (Gorn, Pham & Sin, 2001). The data of Study 2 were indeed in line with 
arousal misattribution processes: individuals gave higher probability estimates when they were 
asked after providing a probability estimate how exciting the game was. Additional evidence was 
provided from the arousal ratings: Arousal was greater if it was rated before the provision of 
probability estimates than when it was rated afterwards. Although such an effect on arousal 
ratings would not seem necessary on the SLH, this decrease is consistent with arousal 
misattribution, as participants attributed the arousal to the likelihoods rather than to having a 
stake in the outcome if being asked after they made probability estimates. Thus, Study 2 
demonstrated the impact of arousal in a more direct fashion than Study 1. Nevertheless, 
Vosgerau (2010) does not address the alternative explanation for the order effect on arousal 
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ratings that it might have been possible that participants did not enjoy providing the probability 
estimate. Before participants knew that they would have to provide the estimate, they might have 
thought that the prospect of the game sounds exciting, since they might win something. 
Afterwards, however, they might have realised it was not so exciting since they had to actually 
perform some math. This could explain why the ratings of excitement were lower after the 
probability estimate. Whilst this argument doesn’t explain why probability estimates decreased 
after participants provided arousal ratings, it highlights the lack of a direct, objective measure of 
arousal in extant tests of the SLH.  
In Study 3, Vosgerau (2010) provided evidence for the notion that valenced, and 
therefore supposedly arousal-eliciting, events are assigned greater subjective probabilities than 
neutral events. In this study, participants judged the likelihood of a 6 coming up at least twice in 
four dice throws. Depending on their condition, participants could either win or lose a shot glass. 
Specifically, participants were asked to estimate the chance that they would lose (vs. win) the 
shot glass, or were asked simply to estimate the outcome of the dice throws without any outcome 
attached. In addition, Vosgerau (2010) included a “low imaginability” condition in which 
participants were asked to estimate the chance that a 6 would occur at least twice in the four 
throws (as opposed to focussing on the outcome of winning a shot glass). If inflated probability 
estimates in the positive domain are a result of greater imaginability (e.g., Bilgin, 2012; Carroll, 
1978; Risen & Gilovich, 2007), the “low imaginability” condition should yield lower probability 
estimates than the other positive condition. Vosgerau observed higher probability estimates in 
the conditions that included a stake in the outcome compared than those observed in the neutral 
condition, with higher estimates in the negative condition than the positive condition.   
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However, the role of imagination cannot be completely ruled out in this study. Vosgerau 
(2010) did not include a manipulation check for the imaginability condition. Secondly, a “low 
imaginability” condition was only included for the win, but not for the loss condition, making 
this an incomplete design and allowing for the interpretation that imaginability might indeed 
affect positive and negative outcomes differently. Finally, the absence of evidence for 
imagination as a mechanism does not necessarily constitute evidence for the SLH, as other 
proposed mechanisms (e.g., loss function asymmetries) also predict the present findings. 
Moreover, by collapsing across the positive and negative utility conditions, it is impossible to 
know whether the difference from the neutral condition is driven by both the negative and the 
positive outcome conditions, or whether indeed only the negative condition (in which 
participants gave statistically higher estimates than in the positive condition) was driving these 
differences.  
Finally, Vosgerau’s Study 4 asked German university students before an important 
football match to estimate the likelihood of the team favoured by the vast majority of students to 
win or to lose the match. Arousal was manipulated by either telling participants that they would 
watch the game live (high arousal), or with a delay (lower arousal – see Vosgerau, Wertenbroch 
& Carmon, 2006). Depending on their outcome focus, participants assigned higher probabilities 
for winning or losing when watching the game live. Vosgerau (2010) interprets these results as 
being congruent with the SLH account, arguing that arousal was only misattributed in the live 
condition, as individuals were less aroused when not watching the game live. However, arousal 
was again not assessed directly. A possible alternative explanation for these results is provided 
by Construal Level Theory (CLT – Trope & Liberman, 2002; 2003). CLT provides a framework 
for the construct of psychological distance – the subjective experience of how far an event or 
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object is from the current self. Because a recorded game is distant in time from the present self, it 
could be perceived as being higher in psychological distance. Wakslak and Trope (2009; see 
also, Wakslak, 2012; Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006) also proposed that the 
subjective probability of events high in psychological distance will be lower than for events 
lower in psychological distance, thus predicting the very effect reported in Vosgerau’s Study 4. 
In conclusion, Vosgerau (2010) provided some indirect evidence for arousal 
misattribution as a mechanism underlying the impact of utility on probability estimates across 
four studies. However, concrete evidence for arousal as a mechanism is not provided. The most 
direct evidence for the SLH, in Study 2 where subjective arousal was assessed subjectively, was 
demonstrated only for positive, but not for negative outcomes. Experiment 1 aimed to close this 
gap by measuring arousal directly, to determine whether it could mediate the effect of negative 
utility on probability estimates.  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 aimed to test the prediction of the SLH that arousal from an aversive event is 
misattributed to likelihood estimates. In order to directly assess arousal, we measured 
electrodermal activity (EDA), where changes in EDA reflect changes in arousal levels in 
response to emotional stimuli (Andreassi, 2007; Boucsein, 2012; Dawson, Schell, & Courtney, 
2011; Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007). EDA can be separated into a phasic and a tonic 
component. Phasic activity relates to a response to a specific stimulus, whereas tonic activity 
relates to responses to chronic stimuli over a longer period of time, reflecting a more general 
level of arousal (Dawson et al. 2007). The tonic driver in this context is more meaningful than 
the phasic driver, as participants read passages of text when which didn’t allow to match phasic 
activity to one emotional stimulus (here: words). As the tonic driver increases in response to 
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emotional material (e.g. Sundar & Kalyanaraman, 2004), and following Vosgerau (2010), it was 
expected that negative scenarios should lead to an increase in arousal (and as such in the tonic 
driver), which in turn should increase probability estimates.  
Following Harris et al. (2009), probability estimates were elicited for fictional scenarios, 
in which participants  were provided with an objective basis for their subjective estimates and 
this objective basis was identical across the utility manipulations. Any systematic difference 
between the estimates of probability across conditions is consequently directly attributable to the 
manipulation of utility. Two scenarios were employed in Experiment 1. One was a version of 
Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 3, adapted to enable us to manipulate negative utility, which we had 
found to exert a stronger effect on probability estimates than positive utility in pilot work (de 
Moliere, 2014). A second scenario employed an adapted version of the visual display of George 
Louis Leclerc’s “Buffon’s Coin” problem (see Strick, 2007).  
  
Method 
 Participants. 127 Participants were recruited (101 female, median age=19 years2). 
Participants either received a payment of £3 or 0.5 course credits as a reimbursement for 
participating in this experiment.  
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (utility: neutral/negative) x 2 
(scenario: dice/container) mixed design, the last factor manipulated within participants. 
Dependent variables were subjective probability estimates and the change in tonic EDA activity 
                                                 
2 One participant typed “2” as the answer to how old they are. Since all participants were adults tested in the 
laboratory, we assumed that this was a typing mistake and did not include it when calculating the median of age.  
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from baseline measures, experienced during the presentation of the scenarios (see Technical 
Appendix for details). 
 Materials and Procedure. 
 Physiological measurements. Upon arrival in the lab, participants were informed that the 
research concerned decision-making and physiology. Participants were seated in front of the 
computer, all physiological equipment was attached (see Technical Appendix) and a baseline 
measure of EDA was obtained for one minute.  
Probability Estimates. The two scenarios (counterbalanced presentation) were presented 
with Eprime (version 2.0). To allow EDA responses to return to baseline after each scenario, 
participants were instructed to relax during a 1-minute break between scenarios.  
For the container scenario, participants read the following in the negative condition 
(neutral condition in brackets):  
A container is to be dropped from the air, and will land somewhere in the area depicted 
below, with all locations equally likely. The container contains toxic chemicals (natural, 
organic materials), which are fatally poisonous to humans (pose no risk to people or the 
environment). 
Below, you see the area where the container could land. The blue lines are an 
underground watercourse, which supply drinking water to a large city. The red circle 
indicates the size of the area where toxic chemicals will be released. If this area 
overlaps at all with one of the water veins, the chemicals will be released into the 
drinking water, killing thousands of people (making it taste very slightly different with 
no threat to health). 
By looking at the picture below, what is the chance that the container lands so that it 
overlaps with one of the water veins, thus poisoning the large city’s drinking water and 
killing thousands (causing the large city’s drinking water to taste very slightly 
different)? 
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The “area where the container could land” and the “red circle” shown to participants is 
reproduced in Figure 1.  
 
 Figure 1. Probability display in the “Container” scenario.  
 
For the dice scenario, participants in the negative condition read: 
Imagine you walk down the street and find $100. You picked it up, so the $100 is in your 
pocket. However, a very rich, arrogant and rude person was bending down just as you 
picked up the $100. Seeing a dice for sale in the window of a nearby thrift shop, they 
propose the following: 
You will roll the regular, six-sided dice 4 times. If a 6 comes up on at least 2 of these 
throws, the rich person will get the $100 and you will lose the $100. Otherwise you can 
keep it.  
What do you think is the chance that a 6 would turn up on at least 2 out of 4 throws, so 
you would lose the money to the very rich, arrogant and rude person? 
 
In the neutral version of this scenario, a person, described simply as ‘another person’ 
(i.e., omitting the rich, arrogant and rude aspect that was designed to increase negativity in the 
negative condition), proposes the same game. There is no reference to money or any outcome 
involved, and the dice roll has no consequences.  
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Estimates for both scenarios were provided on slider scales anchored at 0 (absolutely 
impossible) and 100 (absolutely certain). The exact integer value of the slider’s position was 
displayed to participants.  
Participants next completed a variety of tasks designed to assess their interoceptive 
awareness:  a heartbeat counting task (Schandry, 1981) and associated questions assessing 
strategies for this task as well as participants’ frequency of physical activity; Consciousness of 
Body: Private scale (Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981); Sense of Power scale (Anderson, John, & 
Keltner, 2012); positive and negative affect scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988); short form 
of the state and trait anxiety scale (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). These measures are not discussed 
further.3  
Finally, a manipulation check asked participants to estimate how “bad” the negative 
outcomes (container overlapping with a water vein, other person rolling 2x a 6) would be on a 7-
point Likert scale (0 “not bad at all” to 7 “very bad”).  
Results 
Of the 129 participants, 8 were excluded from all analyses for not following experimental 
instructions. 
                                                 
3 The experiment was conducted as part of LdM’s doctoral thesis (de Molière, 2014), which originally aimed to 
investigate the moderating role of social power and interoceptive awareness on the influence of arousal on estimates 
of probability, in an attempt to better delineate the SLH from the asymmetric loss function hypothesis (Weber, 1994) 
of the interdependence of utility and probability estimates. Finding no mediating effect of arousal means that these 
measures are not relevant to the current research goals. Because of its relevance to the asymmetric loss function 
hypothesis, and the possibility that arousal misattribution might only occur for events high in decision-control, a 
third scenario that was intended to be low in decision-control was included after the two reported here for 
participants 36-129. Given the lack of support for the SLH in the scenarios most similar to Vosgerau (2010), and due 
to the lower number of participants in this additional scenario for physiological analysis, we did not analyse the 
physiological data for this scenario, which is not discussed further.  
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 Data Preparation. 
  Relative change in tonic activity was analysed for  the dice and container scenarios 
separately (see Technical Appendix for details).  
The EDA data of a further 8 participants were unsuitable for analysis, with an additional 
4 removed from only the analysis of the container scenario and a further 4 from the dice 
scenario. In addition, 2 participants were excluded for not moving the slider in the container 
scenario, and 4 for not moving the slider in the dice scenario. The final sample consisted of 104 
participants in the dice, and 106 participants in the container scenario.  
 Data Analysis. 
 Manipulation Checks. The manipulation of utility was successful in both the dice 
scenario (negative: M = 4.84, SD = 2.28; neutral: M = 1.64, SD = 1.31), t(100.26) = 9.57, p < 
.001, and the container scenario (negative: M = 8.13, SD = 1.55; neutral: M = 4.54, SD = 2.46), 
t(94.17) = 9.48, p < .001 (dfs adjusted due to inequality of variances). 
Container Scenario. The relationship between utility and the change in the tonic driver 
was marginally significant in the predicted direction, in that individuals in the negative condition 
experienced a greater change in tonic arousal (M=.78, SD=.91) than individuals in the neutral 
condition (M=.45, SD=.99)  t(105)=1.8, p=.07. However, the crucial impact of arousal on 
probability was not significant, t(105)=1.62, p=.11. Finally, whilst participants in the negative 
condition provided greater estimates (M=37.24, SD=20.04) than participants in the neutral 
condition (M=31.5, SD=19.67), the relationship between utility and probability estimates was 
not significant, t(105)=1.49, p=.14. Thus, there was no support for the role of arousal in the 
impact of utility on probability estimates in the container scenario.  
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  Dice Scenario. The impact of utility on the change in the tonic driver was non-significant 
(Mnegative=.85, SD=.97 vs. Mneutral=.83, SD=.99), t(102)=0.08, p=.94. However, the impact of 
utility on probability estimates was marginally significant in the dice scenario, t(102)=1.95, 
p=.054, in that individuals in the negative condition provided greater estimates (M=27.69, 
SD=17.7) than participants in the neutral condition (M=21.46, SD=14.76). Thus, whilst there 
was a marginally significant relationship between utility and probability estimates, arousal was 
not impacted by the manipulation of utility, providing no evidence for the SLH in the dice 
scenario.  
Discussion 
In sum, Experiment 1 offered no support for the hypothesis that arousal (as measured by 
EDA response) mediates the impact of utility on probability estimates. It is possible, however, 
that whilst arousal misattribution indeed underlies the relationship between utility and 
probability, our methods in Experiment 1 were not appropriate to detect this. In addition to the 
potential for the type of arousal posited in the SLH to not be reflected in EDA responses (an 
issue to which we return in the General Discussion), our experiment employed hypothetical 
scenarios rather than real monetary incentives, which might have elicited less arousal than in 
Vosgerau’s original experiments where participants had a stake in the outcome, and the arousal 
evoked by the utility manipulation could have been too weak to be detected by our equipment. In 
addition, measuring physiological arousal might have drawn participants’ attention to the actual 
source of their arousal. Once individuals are aware of the source of arousal, misattribution is less 
likely to occur (Reisenzein & Gattinger, 1982).  
Before going any further with this line of enquiry, we decided it would be prudent to 
assess the reliability of the initial support of the SLH. Therefore, in the next experiments, rather 
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than testing further predictions derived from the SLH, we aim to assess the status of the SLH by 
replicating the effects originally reported by Vosgerau (2010).  
In the following, we present three experiments aiming to replicate Vosgerau’s (2010) 
Study 2, and one experiment aiming to replicate Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 1. Such replication 
attempts can be direct or conceptual (Schmidt, 2009), constituting replications that employ the 
original materials or extend the theory to another set of stimuli, respectively. Experiments 2 (run 
online) and 5 (run in the laboratory) constitute conceptual replications of Vosgerau’s (2010) 
Studies 2 and 1, respectively. Experiments 3 and 4 (run in the laboratory) are direct replications 
of Vosgerau’s Study 2.  
Of Vosgerau’s (2010) four experiments, we considered Study 2 to be the strongest 
demonstration of arousal misattribution as a mechanism. Study 2 was the only study in which 
arousal was actually assessed (via self-report) and the misattribution hypothesis was actually 
tested. In Study 2, Vosgerau (2010) demonstrated that probability estimates decreased once the 
source of arousal was salient, supporting the notion that arousal is misattributed under conditions 
where the source of the arousal is not salient. To pre-empt our results: Three replications of 
Study 2 yielded no evidence for the existence of arousal misattribution in the formation of 
probability estimates. Finally, Experiment 5 failed to replicate the effect of paper color on 
probability estimates (Vosgerau, Study 1).  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 aimed to replicate Vosgerau’s Study 2. Vosgerau (2010) only tested the 
manipulation of the arousal misattribution process for positive, but not for negative events. 
Moreover, Vosgerau tested this effect for both focal and non-focal events. Whilst the effect 
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appeared very strong for the (arguably more positive) focal event (“what is the probability that at 
least one 3 will show up”), this was reduced for the (arguably more negative) non-focal event 
(“what is the probability that no 3 will show up”). It therefore remains a possibility that arousal 
misattribution occurs for positive, but not for negative events. Therefore, the current experiment 
aimed to replicate Vosgerau’s Study 2, as well as to extend it to negative and neutral events.  
In addition, the current experiment only used the dice scenario, with the same probability 
level as Vosgerau (2010), resembling his study more closely (“at least one 3 within four rolls”). 
In the original study, participants indicated higher arousal if arousal was rated before, compared 
to after, providing probability estimates. If we were to include more than one scenario, a 
meaningful interpretation of arousal ratings would not be possible since arousal questions of the 
later scenarios would have been preceded by likelihood estimates.  
Method 
Participants and Design. 303 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and paid $0.20 to participate in this online experiment. Following previous exclusion criteria, the 
final sample consisted of 285 participants (100 female, median age = 27 years). Note that we 
more than tripled the cell size from Vosgerau’s (2010) 13 participants per cell to approximately 
47 participants per cell. Participants were randomly assigned to a 3 (utility: 
positive/neutral/negative) x 2 (order: arousal rating first/probability estimate first) between 
participants design. 
Materials and Procedure. Participants were informed that they would participate in a 
study on risk perception. Participants read the dice scenario. In the positive utility condition 
participants read: 
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Imagine you are walking down the street with another person. Seeing a dice for sale in 
the window of a nearby thrift shop, they propose the following:  
You will role a six-sided dice 4 times. If a 3 comes up on at least 1 of these throws, the 
other person will give you $100. Otherwise they will keep it.  
 
The negative and neutral conditions were the same as in Experiment 1, except that the focal 
outcome for the dice roll was a 3 coming up on at least 1 throw out of 4. 
In all conditions, participants estimated the probability that at least one 3 shows up on 
four throws and provided their answer using the same 0-100 scale as in Experiment 1. Depending 
on the order condition, participants were either asked before or after the provision of the 
probability estimate to answer the questions: “how much would you like playing this game?” and 
“how exciting would it be to play this game”?, both on 8-point Likert-scales from 0 (not at all) to 
7 (very much).  
Finally, participants completed the Consciousness of Body: Private scale (Miller et al. 
1981). This measure is not discussed further (see Footnote 5). 
Results and Discussion   
Probability Estimates. The arousal misattribution account predicts that probability 
estimates for the negative and positive conditions are both higher than estimates for the neutral 
condition, when the arousal question is asked afterwards.  
 A 3 (utility: negative/neutral/positive) x 2 (order: arousal rating first/probability estimate 
first) ANOVA yielded no significant main effect of utility, F(2,270)=1.8, p=.17, η2=.01. 
However, directionally, participants in the negative condition gave the highest probability 
estimates (M=47.9, SD=23.84), followed by participants in the neutral (M=43.37, SD=21.47) 
and positive condition (M=42.04, SD=21.33). The direction of these means are not in line with 
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the SLH, which would have predicted greater estimates for positive and negative compared to 
neutral events. Furthermore, contrary to the predictions by the SLH, the effect of order, 
F(1,279)=2.15, p=.14, η2=.01, and the utility*order interaction, F<1, were non-significant (see 
Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Probability estimate means for the utility and order conditions. Error bars represent +/- 
1 standard error of the mean. 
 
Arousal Ratings. As the two arousal questions were highly correlated, r(285)=.81, p<.001, they 
were averaged into one arousal score and submitted to a 3 (utility: negative/neutral/positive) x 2 
(order: arousal rating first/probability estimate first) between participants ANOVA. A main 
effect of utility was present, F(2,279)=94.49, p<.001, η2=.41. Participants in the positive 
condition gave the highest arousal ratings (M=5.6, SD=1.46), followed by participants in the 
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neutral (M =3.84, SD=1.62) and negative conditions (M =2.52, SD=1.52). Whilst a main effect 
of utility would be expected, where both individuals in the negative and positive conditions 
report to be more aroused than participants in the neutral condition, it was not expected that 
individuals in the negative condition reported lower arousal than individuals in the neutral 
condition. This result might hint towards an inappropriate arousal question for the negative 
condition. We employed the original questions from Vosgerau (2010) that asked participants 
how “excited” they were, and how much they “liked” playing the game. These questions, 
however, are exclusively concerned with the enjoyment associated with a game and thus 
confound arousal and valence. More appropriate questions in the negative domain could be to 
ask participants how “anxious” they would be playing the game, and how much they “disliked” 
playing the game. 
Furthermore, following the SLH, it was expected that participants’ ratings of arousal 
decrease if they rate their arousal after the provision of probability estimates (as arousal is then 
misattributed). In particular, this effect was expected to occur for the negative and positive, but 
not for the arousal-free neutral condition. However, arousal ratings were not affected by the main 
effect of order, F(2,279)=1.75, p=.19, η2=.01, and the order*utility interaction was not 
significant, F<1 (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Arousal ratings for the utility and order conditions. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard 
error of the mean. 
 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 2 was unable to extend the results of Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 2 to the 
negative domain, but also failed to replicate Vosgerau’s results in the positive domain. 
Participants’ probability estimates did not decrease when they were directed to the source of the 
arousal, and arousal levels did not decrease when rated after the probability estimates.  
However, there were a number of differences between Experiment 2 and the original 
study. Above all, Experiment 2 was conducted online without real monetary outcomes, whereas 
in Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 2 participants had the chance to earn $5. Although mean arousal 
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ratings in the positive utility condition of Experiment 2 (see Figure 3) were similar to those in 
Vosgerau’s ‘arousal rating first’ condition (M = 5.06, SD = 1.15), this remains a salient 
difference between the two studies.  
Experiment 3 was therefore a direct, laboratory-based, replication of Vosgerau’s Study 2, 
using the same manipulations, the same computer program to display instructions, and the same 
rewards in the laboratory4. This also included a £1 incentive for accuracy5. Given the difficulties 
in asking a functionally equivalent arousal question in the negative domain, and the unexpected 
trends in the neutral condition, we only conducted this experiment with positive outcomes, as in 
the original study. We again omitted Vosgerau’s non-focal outcome condition (what is the 
likelihood of getting no 3s in four dice rolls) and only measured the focal outcome (what is the 
likelihood of getting a 3 at least once in four dice rolls), as the arousal rating had the strongest 
effect on probability estimates in this condition in the original study.  
Method 
Participants and Design. 30 Participants took part in this experiment (15 females, 
median age =22 years) conducted in the laboratory. With 15 participants per cell, we therefore 
employed a similar cell size as the original study (cell size = 13) by Vosgerau (2010). 
Participants received a chocolate bar in return for their participation, in addition to any money 
won during the experiment, and were randomly assigned to one of the two order conditions 
(probability first/arousal first).  
                                                 
4£3 is the nearest integer amount in GBP to $5. 
5 Vosgerau (2010) provided a $1 incentive for accuracy. 
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Procedure and Materials. Participants were approached opportunistically and were 
asked to participate in a brief study on risk perception in which they would get a chocolate bar 
and could win some money. The experimenter then started the original computer program from 
Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 2, generously provided to us by the author. Participants read the 
following instructions on the screen: “You will toss a die four times. If you toss a "3" (one or 
several 3s) in the four tosses you win £3”. Afterwards, participants were given the following 
instructions: “In order to make sure that you understand the game, please describe it in your own 
words below. Please ask the experimenter if anything is not clear“. After participants described 
the task in their own words, they were asked the questions: “How much do you like playing this 
game” and “How exciting is it to play this game”, both on 7-point Likert scales (1 not at all – 7 
very much), either before or after they were asked to estimate the probability of a 3 occurring. As 
in Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 3, probability estimates were provided on a 21-point scale ranging 
from 0-100% in 5% increments. The instructions for the probability judgment were: “How likely 
do you think it is that you will toss one or more 3s in the four rolls? If your probability estimate 
is within 5% of the true probability, you will receive an extra £1.” Finally, participants 
completed demographic information, rolled the dice, and were paid with any money won during 
the task as well as with a chocolate bar. 
Results 
Probability Estimates. Contrary to the predictions of the SLH, there was no main effect 
of order, F<1, with the direction of means in the opposite direction to the original findings 
(probability rated after arousal ratings: M=42.67, SD=25.49; probability rated before arousal 
ratings: M=37.33, SD=25.2).  
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Arousal Ratings. Since the correlation between the two questions was high, r(30)=.80, 
p<.001, we averaged the two questions. The average was then submitted to an ANOVA. The 
main effect of order was not significant, F<1. Again, the direction of means was in the opposite 
direction to the original findings (arousal rated after probability: M=4.43, SD=1.23; arousal rated 
before probability: M=4.03, SD=1.04).  
Experiment 4 
 Experiment 3 failed to replicate Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 2, despite using identical 
materials. However, we offered participants a mars-bar for participating, irrespective of the 
outcome (to make sure that participants would be compensated for taking part in the experiment 
in case they did not win the money). As offering a sugary, fatty reward could potentially lead to a 
‘hot’ visceral state that could interfere with probability estimates (see Risen & Critcher, 2011), 
we repeated the identical experimental set-up, but did not mention the chocolate-bar at the start 
of the experiment. Therefore, Experiment 4 removes the only difference in the experimental set-
up of our Experiment 5 and Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 2, and thus constitutes a direct replication 
attempt.   
Method 
40 participants  (24 female, median age =23.5 years) took part in this experiment, slightly 
increasing the cell size to 20 participants per cell (compared to Vosgerau’s, 2010, 13 participants 
per cell). Participants were reimbursed with money won during the task (if participants did not 
win anything, they were reimbursed with a chocolate bar, unknown to participants when starting 
the task).  
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When approached, participants were told that there was a chance to win money, but there 
was no mention of a chocolate bar. In all other respects, the method was identical to Experiment 
3.  
Results 
Probability Estimates. The results of Experiment 3 were replicated. There was again no 
main effect of order, F<1, and the direction of means was in the opposite direction to the original 
findings (probability rated after arousal ratings: M=49.55, SD=24.82; probability rated before 
arousal ratings: M=47.77, SD=27.18).  
Arousal Ratings. The correlation between the two questions was high, r(40)=.74, 
p<.001, and we averaged the two questions. In this experiment, there was a significant effect of 
order on arousal, F(1,38)=6.92, p=.01, η2=.15. As predicted by the SLH, when answering the 
arousal questions before the probability judgment, participants rated their arousal to be higher 
(M=5.55, SD=1.22) compared to when they answered the arousal questions afterwards (M=4.39, 
SD=1.55).  
Combining Experiments 3 and 4 
Vosgerau (2010) employed 13 participants per cell, which likely constitutes an 
underpowered design. A lack of power can enhance the likelihood of false positive results (e.g., 
Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Our failed replications suggest that Vosgerau’s results 
may indeed be false positive results, but a lack of power can also give rise to false negative 
results. As Experiments 3 and 4 were identical in almost all aspects, we combined the data from 
these two experiments to double the sample size. Order had no impact on probability estimates in 
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this analysis (F < 1), with the trend in the effects being in the opposite direction to that predicted 
by SLH (see Table 1).  
Bayesian Meta-Analysis across Experiments 2, 3 and 4 
Conventional significance testing cannot provide support in favour of the null hypothesis. 
As a result of the greater attention paid to replications recently, some researchers have argued for 
the application of Bayesian statistical tests (e.g. Gallistel, 2009; Rouder et al. 2009; 
Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & Van Der Maas, 2011). Bayesian tests compare the degree 
to which the obtained data are likely under two different hypotheses and thus can be used to 
provide an indication of how much more likely the data are to obtain under the null hypothesis 
(effect size = 0), or a specified alternative hypothesis. The appropriate specification of the 
alternative hypothesis is difficult to know a priori. For the current analyses we employ the 
default Cauchy prior with a scale of √2 / 2, which is perceived as appropriate under a broad array 
of situations (Rouder et al. 2009; but see Simonsohn, 2015, for critique - for replies see Morey, 
2015; Rouder & Hilgard, 2015). Typically, the null hypothesis is that the effect size is exactly 
zero, while any value greater or less than this constitutes evidence for an alternative hypothesis. 
In the present analysis, however, we have arranged our data such that the SLH predicts a positive 
effect (see Table 1). We therefore test a point null hypothesis (effect size is exactly 0) against a 
positive alternative hypothesis with a Cauchy distribution truncated at zero as the prior 
distribution (Morey & Rouder, 2011) 6. In this way, only effect sizes greater than zero (and not 
effect sizes in the opposite direction) are consistent with the alternative hypothesis. 
                                                 
6 Morey and Rouder (2011) Figure 8, Panel B, provides a graphical illustration of this test, although here we employ 
a strict point null, rather than including a range of small “unimportant” positive effects in the null hypothesis.  
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The evidence in favour of the null hypothesis over the SLH (as specified by the default 
prior distribution) for our replications of Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 2 is assessed by a Bayesian 
meta-analysis conducted across all three replication experiments (for instructions see Rouder & 
Morey, 2011). This meta-analysis assumes that the true effect size is constant across experiments. 
However, it does not assume equal variances, which makes it applicable to the current set of 
experiments where different variances could have been produced, for example by different 
means of recruiting participants (e.g. online in Experiment 2, in the laboratory in Experiments 3 
and 4).   
We applied this meta-analytic Bayes factor to the probability estimates of the three 
experiments we conducted (we only considered the data from the positive condition of 
Experiment 4). Here, we only report the Bayes factor for probability estimates, as the decrease in 
arousal levels is only of interest as a potential mediating mechanism should there really be a 
decrease in probability. 
 For each, we first extracted the t-value of order (arousal rating first/probability estimate 
first) (see Table 1 for the t-values associated with the three experiments). We then analysed the 
data using the R package Bayes Factor, together with a script for a Bayesian meta-analysis, 
written by Rouder & Morey (2011). This analysis revealed a value of 6.08 to 1 in favour of the 
null hypothesis over the SLH for the present Experiments 2, 3 and 47. As such, the current results 
constitute “some” evidence in favour of a null over the SLH (Rouder et al. 2009, p.228).   
                                                 
7 One can argue that we should have also conducted a meta-analysis across Experiments 3 and 4 rather than simply 
combining them. We therefore also ran the Bayesian meta analysis on Experiments 3 and 4. This analysis shows a 
value of 5.78 to 1 in favour of the null hypothesis over the SLH.  
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Table 1. 
The number of participants, the t-value associated with the main effect of order, and whether the 
results were in the direction predicted by the SLH for the Experiments 2, 3 and 4.  
 N t Direction Predicted 
by SLH 
Experiment 2 95 .42 Yes 
Experiment 3 30 -.58 No 
Experiment 4 40 -.21 No 
Data pooled 165 -.37 1/3 
 
Experiment 5 
Given our repeated failure to replicate Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 2 across three 
experiments, we next aimed to replicate Vosgerau’s (2010) Study 1. In his Study 1, Vosgerau 
(2010) asked participants to estimate the probabilities of nine future outcomes, such as “How 
likely do you think Barack Obama is to become the Democratic presidential candidate?”, or 
“How likely do you think the Steelers are to win the Super Bowl in 2008?”. Vosgerau (2010) 
included two sets of questions (manipulated between participants), one of which was the 
complement of the other set (e.g. “How likely do you think Barack Obama is not to become the 
Democratic presidential candidate?”). These questions were either presented on bright pink 
paper, which was assumed to increase arousal, or on grey paper, which was assumed to not 
evoke arousal. Vosgerau (2010) demonstrated that when participants read the statements on pink 
paper, they provided higher probabilities than when they read the statements on grey paper.  
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Method 
Participants and Design. 177 participants (97 female, median age = 20 years) took part 
in the experiment and were recruited opportunistically on the campus of University College 
London (similar to Vosgerau, 2010, who recruited passers-by close to the campus of the 
University of Pittsburgh). Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (colour: pink/grey) x 2 
(focus: version1/version2) x 10 (probability questions) mixed design, with repeated measures on 
the last factor.  
Materials and Procedure. Materials and procedure closely followed Vosgerau’s (2010) 
set up. Half the participants were asked 10 likelihood questions, whereas the other half answered 
10 questions with complementary likelihoods (see Table 2). Following Vosgerau (2010), arousal 
was manipulated by printing questionnaires either on “bright pink” paper (arousal) or on “light 
grey” paper (no arousal)8. As in Vosgerau (2010), likelihood judgments were made on a 21-point 
scale ranging from 0% to 100%, in 5% increments.  
This set-up closely follows the original set-up by Vosgerau (2010). However, one of the 
differences between the original and the present experiment are the questions used, as the 
original study included events that had either occurred already or were not relevant to our 2014 
U.K. participants. We therefore used two of the original items, which did not depend on time or 
location, and added eight items - inspired by Vosgerau’s original items - that were more relevant 
to our participants. Another likely difference between the experiments is the precise paper used. 
                                                 
8 The papers used were named thus, and purchased from http://www.ebay.co.uk/itm/A4-Coloured-Paper-Card-
Multi-Use-Printing-Copier-Cardmaking-Colour-Craft-Sheet-/281188280909 (URL correct as of 06/02/2015). 
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There were no records of the paper brand used in Vosgerau (2010), so we chose the most 
fluorescent pink possible (as did Vosgerau, personal communication, 22.01.2014).  
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Table 2. 
Probability estimation questions asked in Experiment 5. Questions 1 and 5 are original items 
from Vosgerau (2010). 
Focus 
Version 1 
Ten outcome questions 
Version 2 
Ten complementary outcome questions 
1. How likely do you think it is that of 80 
passengers on an airplane, none of the 
passengers will have been born on the same 
day (i.e. same day but not necessarily same 
year)? 
1. How likely do you think it is that of 80 
passengers on an airplane, at least two will 
have been born on the same day (i.e. same 
day but not necessarily same year)? 
2. How likely do you think it is that Roger 
Federer will win Wimbledon 2014? 
2. How likely do you think it is that Roger 
Federer won’t win Wimbledon 2014? 
3. How likely do you think it is that Great 
Britain will not break their existing record for 
gold medals in the next summer Olympics? 
3. How likely do you think it is that Great 
Britain will break their existing record for 
gold medals in the next summer Olympics? 
4. How likely do you think it is that Prince 
William and his wife Catherine won’t have 
another baby by the end of 2016? 
4. How likely do you think it is that Prince 
William and his wife Catherine will have 
another baby by the end of 2016? 
5. If a six-sided die is tossed four times, how 
likely do you think a 6 is to appear exactly 
twice in the four tosses? 
5. If a six-sided die is tossed four times, how 
likely do you think a 6 is to appear fewer or 
more than two times in the four tosses? 
6. How likely do you think it is that the 
average temperature in South West England 
for June this year won’t be higher than 
previous records of the last 10 years? 
6. How likely do you think it is that the 
average temperature in South West England 
for June this year will be higher than previous 
records of the last 10 years? 
7. How likely do you think it is that it will 
snow in London in January 2015? 
7. How likely do you think it is that it won’t 
snow in London in January 2015? 
8. How likely do you think it is that Scotland 
will not become independent following the 
upcoming referendum? 
8. How likely do you think it is that Scotland 
will become independent following the 
upcoming referendum? 
9. How likely do you think it is that we will 
find a cure to all cancers in the next 20 years? 
9. How likely do you think it is that we won’t 
find a cure to all cancers in the next 20 years? 
10. How likely do you think it is that organ 
donation will become opt out rather than opt 
in? 
10. How likely do you think it is that organ 
donation will remain opt in rather than 
become opt out? 
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Results 
All but one participant answered all probability questions. Following the procedure of 
Vosgerau (2010), outliers further than 2.5 standard deviations away from the mean were 
removed from further analyses (n=3). The final sample consisted of 173 participants, an increase 
of 22 participants compared to the original study from Vosgerau (2010).  
After averaging across the ten probability questions, a 2 (colour: pink/grey) x 2 (focus: 
version 1/version 2) between subjects ANOVA was conducted. Expectedly, this ANOVA 
yielded a significant main effect of focus, F(1,169)=13.67, p<.001, η2=.08. Participants who 
answered version 2 of the questionnaire (see Table 2) gave higher probability estimates 
(M=51.67, SD=9.35) compared to participants who answered version 1 (M=46.52, SD=9.03). 
Critically, however, colour did not significantly impact probability estimates, F(1,169)=1.05, 
p=.31, η2=.01, and there was no colour*focus interaction, F<1 (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Probability estimate means for participants answering version 1 or version 2 on either 
pink, or grey paper. Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
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General Discussion 
Our aim in the present paper was to test the evidential basis for the role of arousal 
misattribution in likelihood judgments, as proposed by the SLH. Experiment 1 included a direct 
online measure of physiological arousal, but found no evidence for arousal mediating the 
influence of utility on probability estimates when measuring arousal with galvanic skin 
responses. We next replicated Studies 1 and 2 of Vosgerau’s (2010) research demonstrating the 
stake-likelihood effect. However, we failed to provide any evidence for the existence of such an 
effect. In an online experiment, Experiment 2 failed to replicate Vosgerau’s (2010) finding that 
when participants attend to the source of their arousal, likelihood estimates decrease. 
Experiments 3 and 4 failed to replicate the same finding in a set-up that matched Vosgerau’s 
(2010) more closely, using his materials in the laboratory. Quantifying these results, a Bayesian 
meta-analysis across Experiments 2, 3 and 4 suggested that the data constituted “some” evidence 
for the null hypothesis (Rouder et al., 2009, p.228). Finally, we observed no evidence for an 
increase in probability estimates when participants provided their estimates on pink (‘arousing’) 
compared to grey (‘unarousing’) paper in Experiment 5.  
Since, to the best of our knowledge, no other research has been published exploring the 
role of arousal in probability estimates, the combination of our inability to demonstrate the 
impact of arousal on probability estimates in Experiment 1 and our inability to reproduce the 
original findings of the SLH across four experiments challenges this explanation for the 
influence of utility on probability estimates. For a misattribution process to occur, two 
independent mechanisms need to take place: First, arousal needs to be created, and next, this 
arousal needs to inform the decision-maker. In our experiments, (at least) one of the two 
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processes did not occur. Whilst in Experiment 1 arousal was increased for one of the two 
scenarios, this increased arousal did not impact probability estimates.   
 Similarly, in Experiment 4 arousal ratings decreased when participants rated arousal after 
the probability estimates – the only time the evidence appeared to be in favour of the SLH in the 
replication experiments. However, it is possible that participants did not enjoy providing 
probability estimates, and therefore the decrease might more reflect how much they enjoyed the 
game (rather than actual arousal levels). Participants were only informed after they rated arousal 
that their estimates were incentivised, which might have increased the pressure to get the 
probability right, decreasing enjoyment of the game. However, even if this decrease in arousal 
ratings reflected an actual reduction in experienced arousal after individuals provided probability 
estimates, we can conclude that greater experienced arousal did not impact probability estimates. 
Only together with a decrease in probability estimates would this observation enhance our 
understanding of the relationship between utility and probability estimates. Additionally, what 
remains unexplained is why arousal decreased in Experiment 4, but not in Experiment 3 (where 
an additional mars-bar was promised to participants at the start of the experiment). In sum, 
however, the evidence for the role of arousal misattribution across these experiments is 
negligible. How, then, should the oft-observed interdependence of utility and estimates of 
probability be explained? 
 As outlined in the Introduction, a number of theories have been proposed. Due to our 
continuing failure to observe evidence consistent with a Wishful Thinking bias under controlled 
laboratory conditions (Experiment 2 in the present paper; de Moliere et al., 2014; see also, Bar-
Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Bar-Hillel et al., 2008; Krizan & Windschitl, 2007), we will here 
expand on what we now believe are the leading candidates for explanations of the undesirability 
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bias (but see Lench, 2009; Lench & Bench, 2012; Lench & Darbor, 2014, for accounts of the 
Wishful Thinking effects they observe). 
 The imagination-based account (Bilgin, 2012; Risen & Gilovich, 2007) proposes that the 
greater attention directed to negative events (see e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & 
Vohs, 2001) leads to an enhanced propensity for spontaneous imagination of undesirable 
potential outcomes, making them more cognitively accessible. Consequently, estimates of their 
likelihood are inflated (on the link between imagination and subjective probability see Carroll, 
1978; Gregory, Cialdini, & Carpenter, 1982; Mevissen, Meertens, Ruiter, & Schaalma, 2012). 
Bilgin (2012) observed that confidence in the occurrence of a positive outcome increased when 
participants were instructed to imagine the outcome occurring. For negative outcomes, however, 
this effect was not observed, but confidence was at the same level as for the ‘imagination-
present’ condition with the positive outcome. This result was taken as evidence that participants 
were already engaging in the imagination in the negative outcome condition, even without 
instruction.9 
The asymmetric loss function account (Weber, 1994) proposes that individuals are aware 
of the fallibility of their probability estimates, and also of the costs associated with different 
types of error. Specifically, for many negative outcomes it is more costly to underestimate the 
likelihood of the negative outcome than it is to overestimate it (e.g., overestimating one’s chance 
of a curable fatal disease and thus making an unnecessary trip to the doctor is less costly than 
underestimating one’s chance). Consequently, people overestimate the likelihood of negative 
                                                 
9 An initial study by our lab failed to replicate this effect (Quantmeyer, 2014), but further work is required, 
especially given the empirical support that also exists from Risen and Gilovich (2007). 
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events under such situations. The relationship with decisions and consequences suggests that 
such effects should only be observed when an outcome is controllable (were the fatal disease 
incurable, there are no costs associated with estimation errors, since the estimate is immaterial). 
Such results were observed in Harris et al. (2009).   
On replication 
The primary aim of experiments is to test theoretical predictions and assumptions. The 
experiments reported in the present paper were all intended to test predictions of the SLH. 
Experiments themselves also contain assumptions. The degree to which these assumptions are 
plausible represents the internal validity of the experiment.  
Experiment 1 made the assumption that an increase in arousal (as conceptualised in the 
SLH) would be reflected in an increase in physiological arousal – as measured by EDA (an 
approach often employed in psychological research, e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1997; Carnagey, Anderson & Bushman, 2007; Rickard, 2004). Arousal, as included in the SLH, 
is not, however, a well specified construct and such an experimental assumption might not be 
appropriate. Without greater specification of ‘arousal’ in the SLH, however, the degree to which 
EDA is a valid measure of this key construct in the SLH is an impossible one to address, 
although EDA is one of the most oft-used measures of physiological arousal (Boucsein, 2012).  
Both Experiments 1 and 2 made the assumption that stake in an outcome could be 
successfully manipulated within a hypothetical scenario. Given that manipulation check 
questions demonstrated that utility was successfully manipulated in Experiment 1, and similar 
evidence was obtained from the arousal ratings in Experiment 2, this assumption would seem to 
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be a fair one, and Experiment 2 had the advantage of a far greater sample size than any of the 
other experiments in the paper, or those reported in Vosgerau (2010). 
Experiments 3, 4 and 5 (direct replications of Vosgerau, 2010) also, of course, contain 
experimental assumptions. Robust support for psychological theory comes from converging 
evidence from a variety of sources. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 alone already cast doubt 
on the status of the SLH, but direct replications have been argued to be the most effective 
approach to reduce the impact of false positives in psychology (Cohen, 1994; Fisher, 1935/1956; 
Pashler & Harris, 2012; Roediger, 2012). In the direct replications reported here, we followed the 
original protocol as closely as possible, and Experiments 3 and 4 were even administered by the 
same computer program that was used in the original experiments (provided to us by the author). 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to eliminate the possibility that previously unidentified moderators 
of the effect led to our inability to replicate the original findings (even Bayesian analyses can’t 
rule out these possibilities!) For example, one salient difference between our lab experiments and 
those of Vosgerau (2010) is that his were conducted in the U.S. and ours were conducted in the 
U.K. Whilst there are no a priori reasons why this should affect the nature of the effect, some 
readers might wish to take our findings as evidence against the SLH in the U.K., but maintain its 
efficacy in the U.S. To us, however, given the lack of theoretical support for such a position, the 
results seem to question the status of the SLH as an explanation for the interdependence of utility 
and subjective probability. 
In addition, it has been noted that effect sizes in the literature are likely to be greater than 
the true effect size (Greenwald, 1975), and when replicating, one should increase the number of 
participants to ensure sufficient statistical power (Brandt et al., 2012). Whilst in all our 
experiments we ensured that the number of participants was greater than in Vosgerau’s (2010) 
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original studies, one might argue that our experiments were underpowered and therefore failed to 
demonstrate the stake-likelihood effect. Figure 5 is a forest plot displaying the effect sizes from 
Vosgerau’s (2010) original studies and our replication experiments, with which the reader can 
reach their own conclusion as to the evidence in support of the effect. The width of the 
confidence intervals reflect the small sample sizes used. However, it can be seen that the effect 
size in Vosgerau’s Study 2 is something of an outlier in that it lies outside the 95% confidence 
intervals of each of its three replications. Combining across our experiments provided no further 
support for the SLH. Finally, Bayes-Factors are more independent from sample size than 
conventional hypothesis testing (see Rouder et al. 2009, for a discussion), and we subsequently 
feel confident in our conclusions in favor of the null hypothesis in our direct replications of 
Vosgerau’s Study 2. Although we did not observe a significant effect in Experiment 5, Figure 5 
demonstrates that the effect size is not reliably different from that observed in Vosgerau’s Study 
1. Note, however, that this experiment neither manipulated utility or measured arousal and thus 
provides very little evidence for the SLH. Experiments 1-4 did all (in one way or another) assess 
these constructs, and provided no evidence for the SLH. 
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Figure 5. A forest plot showing the effect sizes (cohen’s d) and their 95% confidence intervals 
for Vosgerau’s Studies 2 and 1, and for the present replication attempts.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the experiments reported here provided no evidence for arousal 
misattribution as a mechanism for the impact of utility on probability estimates. At this stage, we 
contend that champions of the SLH must provide more evidence for the existence of such an 
effect. A number of theories have previously been proposed to account for the interdependence 
of utility and subjective probability. Whilst there is no prerequisite for these theories to be 
mutually exclusive, questioning the empirical research for the SLH necessarily adds to our 
understanding of the effect of utility on probability estimates. We propose that research attention 
should now turn to delineating the relative contributions of the other accounts put forward in the 
literature to explain these effects.   
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Technical Appendix  
EDA measurement 
An electrodermal activity (EDA) transducer (Finger Transducer, BSL-SS3LA, Biopac 
Systems, Inc) was attached to the index and second finger of the non-dominant hand (all 
behavioral responses in the experiment were made with the dominant hand). The transducer 
consists of two Ag-AgCl electrodes, each with a 6mm diameter, and was attached with a Velcro 
strap after isotonic electrode paste (GEL101, Biopac Systems, Inc, 0.5% saline in neutral base) 
was filled into cavities (1.6mm in depth) in the electrodes, and applied onto the finger tips. The 
electrodes were connected to a Biopac Student Lab (MP36) system and all cables were 
subsequently secured to the table with tape to minimize movement and resulting artefacts. In 
order for the electrodes to establish contact with the skin, participants were instructed to relax for 
5 minutes. Afterwards a baseline measure of EDA was obtained for a time period of 1 minute. 
 
EDA analysis 
EDA features were extracted using the MATLAB toolbox Ledalab (v.3.4.4) by means of 
continuous decomposition analysis (Benedek & Kaernach, 2010), allowing for separation 
between the tonic and phasic activity. As individuals differ in their mean tonic conductivity, and 
in order to infer the relative change of tonic activity following the presentation of emotional 
stimuli, we subtracted the mean tonic baseline arousal from the mean tonic arousal experienced 
during the completion of each scenario, creating one score for each scenario. 
